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‘Contemporary observations are changing our understanding of legal systems, 
and it is important that our nomenclature for norms reflects our current 
understanding. This applies, in particular, to the designation "legal order".’ 
Modified excerpt of Resolution 5 of the International Astronomical 





Since its discovery in 1930, Pluto has been considered a planet. However, this is no longer the case. 
Pluto has lost its prominent status following a—highly controversial
1—Resolution of the International 
Astronomical Union (IAU) of 24 August 2006 that defines what constitutes a planet in a contemporary 
astronomical sense.
2 Given its name, one is inclined to think that Pluto may have been doomed from 
the very beginning of its recognised existence. Of course, this is not a paper on astronomy, but one on 
European law. References to mythology and astrology are, however, very popular and virtually 
omnipresent in European politics and scholarship alike. Depending on the circumstances, they may be 
more or less useful.
3 Pluto has not been used in this regard so far, and of course its chances have 
further dropped with its recent demotion to a ‘dwarf planet’.
4 
So why have I chosen to use Pluto as a metaphor in the title of the present paper? It was certainly 
not (only) because of a feeling of sympathy for some small something that has been treated 
disrespectfully. Instead, it was because of the clarity with which the example displays the importance 
of definitions for our perception of the world around us. In reflecting on the ‘unity of the European 
legal order’, it becomes necessary to reveal the meaning of terminology that underpins it. This is 
particularly important in dealing with one of the most widely used metaphors of European integration 
scholarship, which lies at the heart of the matter: the ‘pillar structure’ of the European Union. 
To describe the European Union as a Greek temple based on three ‘pillars’ is so common among 
European lawyers that it does not require any explanation.
5 It usually goes along with the perception of 
the EC Treaty and the EU Treaty as forming two legal orders, based on two different treaties, separate 
from each other with dissimilar central features. However, some scholarly contributions have always 
argued that EC and EU Law form part of one single and unitary legal order, going along with the 
claim of an international legal personality for the EU or even the fusion of the former Communities 
and the EU by the Treaty of Maastricht. The aim of the present paper is to re-analyse this ‘unity thesis’ 
against the backdrop of the recent case-law of the ECJ. In an increasing number of cases during the 
last years, the Court has had to deal with issues that—naughtily enough—disregarded our beloved 
pillar-picture, due to a growing trend of ‘cross-pillarization’ of the policies of the EU/EC.  
                                                      
*    Dr. jur. Christoph W. Herrmann, LL.M. European Law (London), Wirtschaftsjurist (Univ. Bayreuth) is Assistant 
Professor at the Chair for Public Law and European Law at the University of Munich and Jean-Monnet Fellow at the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute, Florence. I am very grateful to 
Marise Cremona, Christoph Ohler and Rudolf Streinz for their fruitful comments on earlier versions of this paper. The 
responsibility for all shortcomings is mine alone. 
1   More than 300 scientists signed a petition protesting against the definition by the IAU, see K. Chang, Debate Lingers 
Over Definition For a Planet, New York Times, 1 September 2006, p. 13. 
2   See http://www.iau.org/fileadmin/content/pdfs/Resolution_GA26-5-6.pdf. 
3   It seems doubtful, whether it is e.g. really necessary that an Advocate General devotes two out of 17 pages of conclusions 
to references to the myth of Sisyphus and its perception in contemporary European literature, when these remarks are 
irrelevant to the case, but must nevertheless be translated. See conclusions of AG Colomer in C-461/03. For a critical 
comment see C. Herrmann, Die Reichweite der gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Vorlagepflicht in der neueren Rechtsprechung 
des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 17 (2006), Vol. 8, pp. 231 – 235 (235). 
4   See http://www.iau.org/fileadmin/content/pdfs/Resolution_GA26-5-6.pdf. 
5   It has even found its way into wikipedia, cf. www.wikipedia.org. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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Does the description of the European Union as a single legal order make any difference, when it 
comes to solving legal questions? I will argue in the present paper that a lot depends on the perspective 
that you adopt with regard to the meaning of notions like ‘legal order’ and ‘unity’, but that the claim of 
unity does not contribute a great deal to the resolution of interpretative questions that occur with 
regard to the relationship between the different pillars of the European Union. In doing so, I will 
attempt to redesign our Greek temple and to abstain from architecturally unacceptable—since 
statically dangerous—drawings of a ‘cross-pillarized’ building, in which ‘eroding pillars of sculpted 
sandstone’
6 are ‘hijacked’
7 by ‘Russian dolls’.
8 
The Relationship of the EC and EU Legal Orders—Conservative Wisdom Reloaded 
Traditional doctrine does not perceive European Law as consisting of one single and unitary legal 
order. Moreover, the EC and EU Treaties are deemed to form two separate legal orders, a view 
supplemented by the description of the EU as a temple-like construction. The perception of the 
European Union as a roof resting on three pillars is grounded in Article 1(3) TEU, which stipulates: 
‘The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms 
of cooperation established by this Treaty’. 
The semantic differentiation between the ‘European Communities’ and the ‘policies and forms of 
cooperation’ lays the basis for the dichotomy between supranational EC law and intergovernmental 
EU law. Upon this—as well as other provisions of the TEU—rests the negation of an organizational 
character of the European Union—not to speak of legal personality—and its description as a mere 
permanent intergovernmental conference (Regierungskonferenz), or conference of governments. 
Consequently, acts adopted under the second or third pillar are described as agreements between the 
Member States, i.e. as traditional public international treaty law and not as secondary law of an 
International Organization. The key argument put forward is that the EU is not equipped with 
international legal personality, since the TEU lacks an explicit proviso to that end, and contains no 
provisions from which one could derive legal personality under the implied powers doctrine. 
This view, which has been most strongly advocated by Pechstein and König,
9 has recently gained 
new support by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in its decision of 18 July 2005, which held the 
German legislation transposing the Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant
10 
(European Arrest Warrant Act
11) unconstitutional. The second Senate of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
reasoned: 
As a form of action of European Union law, the Framework Decision is situated outside the 
supranational decision-making structure of Community law […]. In spite of the advanced state of 
integration, European Union law is still a partial legal system that is deliberately assigned to public 
                                                      
6   See B. de Witte, The pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic Cathedral?, 
in: T. Heukels/N. Blokker/M. Brus (eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam—A Legal Analysis, The Hague et. al. 
1998, pp. 51 – 67 (55). 
7   See B. de Witte, The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic Cathedral?, 
in: T. Heukels/N. Blokker/M. Brus (eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam—A Legal Analysis, The Hague et. al. 
1998, pp. 51 – 67 (55).; see also D. Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces, CML 
Rev. 30 (1993), pp. 17 – 69 (44). 
8    See D.  Curtin/I.  Dekker, The EU as a “Layered” International Organization: Institutional Unity in Disguise, in: 
P. Craig/G. de Burcà (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford 1999, pp. 83 – 136 (101). 
9   M. Pechstein/C. Koenig, Die Europäische Union, 3rd Ed., Tübingen, 2000, pp. 28 – 78; cf. also 
A. Haratsch/C. Koenig/M. Pechstein, Europarecht, 5th Ed., Tübingen 2006, pp. 29 – 45. 
10  Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States - Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision, 2002/584/JHA, 
OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1–20. 
11  Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz, Bundesgesetzblatt 2004 I, pp. 1748 et seq. Much Ado about Pluto? The ‘Unity of the Legal Order of the European Union’ Revisited 
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international law. This means that a Framework Decision must be adopted unanimously by the 
Council, it requires incorporation into national law by the Member States, and incorporation is not 
enforceable before a court. The European Parliament, autonomous source of legitimisation of 
European law, is merely consulted during the lawmaking process (see Article 39.1 of the Treaty on 
European Union), which, in the area of the “third pillar”, meets the requirements of the principle 
of democracy because the Member States’ legislative bodies retain the political power of drafting 
in the context of implementation, if necessary also by denying implementation.
12 
This position reinforces the view already expressed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht had in its 
Maastricht decision 13 years ago, in which it emphasized the differences between Community Law 
and Union Law.
13 This current reasoning is particularly striking, however, since the decision was 
handed down only one month after the ECJ had extended the principle of consistent interpretation to 
Framework Decisions in Maria Pupino,
14 since there can be no doubt, that the duty developed by the 
ECJ in that case does also apply to constitutional courts of the Member States.
15 However, contrary to 
the Polish Constitutional Court two months before the Pupino ruling, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
made no attempt to interpret the German Basic Law in a way that would have saved the German 
legislation from nullification, even though this would have been possible even without referring to a 
principle of consistent interpretation.
16 This reluctance to do so has been widely criticized, not only by 
Judges Lübbe-Wolff and Gerhardt in their dissenting opinions,
17 but also in academic writings.
18 
However, the Bundesverfassungsgericht did not only disregard the duty of consistent interpretation. 
It also sent—in the words of Judge Lübbe-Wolff—‘dark signals’ to the Court of Justice, by debating 
whether the limited extradition of Germans amounted to an Entstaatlichung (a loss of core elements of 
statehood) of the Federal Republic of Germany, which would be inadmissible under the German 
Constitution. Incidentally, it also emphasised the positive effect of the different character of the third pillar: 
Due to the area-specific restriction of the European ban on discrimination on grounds of Member 
State citizenship, a loss of the core elements of statehood, which would be inadmissible pursuant 
to the regulations of the Basic Law, cannot be established in this context as concerns the 
extradition of German citizens to other Member States. […] 
In particular with a view to the principle of subsidiarity, (Article 23.1 of the Basic Law), the 
cooperation that is put into practice in the “third pillar” of the European Union in the shape of 
limited mutual recognition, which does not provide for a general harmonisation of the Member 
States’ systems of criminal law, is a way of preserving national identity and statehood in a single 
European judicial area. 
One can read this part of the decision as a warning to the Court of Justice that it should not 
disregard the differences between the TEC and the TEU, something the Court might be tempted to do 
in order to break the current constitutional deadlock and bring about some of the changes envisaged by 
                                                      
12    BVerfGE 113, 273 (300 et seq.); English version provided by the Bundesverfassungsgericht available at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20050718_2bvr223604en.html, para. 82. 
13  BVerfGE 89, 155 (195). English translation published in the CMLRev. 1994, pp. 1. 
14  ECJ, C-105/03, Maria Pupino, ECR 2005, I-5285. 
15   Cf. W.  Cremer, Vorabentscheidungsverfahren nach Art. 177 EGV und mitgliedstaatliche Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, 
Bayerische Verwaltungsblätter 130 (1999) 9, pp. 266 – 270. 
16   On the difference between the two judgments see A. Hinarejos Parga, CML Rev. 43 (2006), pp.583 – 595 and 
D. Leczykiewicz, CML Rev. 43 (2006), pp. 1181 – 1191. 
17  See dissenting opinions of Judge G. Lübbe-Wolff (supra Fn. 14 at para. 155 – 184) and of Judge M. Gerhardt (ibid. at 
paras. 185 – 202). 
18  See R. Streinz, Europarecht, 7th Ed., Heidelberg 2005, para. 231; A. Hinarejos Parga, CML Rev. 43 (2006), pp.583 – 595 
(586 et seq.); See also S. Mölders, European Arrest Warrant is Void—The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court of 18 July 2005, GLJ 7 (2006) 1, pp. 45 – 57 with further references to German writings. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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the Constitutional Treaty through the backdoor.
19 The decision thus builds upon the claims of a 
potential unconstitutionality of the TEU if the second and third pillar were interpreted as true 
competences of the EU. In that case, the transfer of the sovereign rights of the Member States would 
be so all-embracing, Pechstein and Koenig contend, that the European Union could only be described 
as a State. That would mean to dismantle the statehood of the Member States, an Entstaatlichung 
which would run contrary to the German constitution as interpreted by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht.
20 
The theme of an alleged Enstaatlichung of Germany also lies at the heart of the pending actions 
against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty brought by the German MP Peter Gauweiler.
21 It is 
noteworthy that one of the Judge Rapporteurs in this case, Judge Broß, in his dissenting opinion in the 
European Arrest Warrant Act case, had already argued that the European Arrest Warrant Act was in 
breach of the limits to European integration imposed by Article 23.1 German Basic Law.
22 However, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht is obviously deeply divided about the issue. This can be inferred from 
the announcement made by Judge Broß that he will not work any further on the action against the 
Constitutional Treaty as long as its future remains uncertain. According to Broß, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht thus wants to abstain from interfering with the constitutional process of the 
EU, which is increasingly precarious after the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands and a 
period of reflection that has lapsed without any noticeable result. However, what appears as an 
exercise of a rather unorthodox kind of judicial self-restraint probably finds its true reason for being in 
a substantial disagreement between the two different Judge Rapporteurs who are responsible for the 
two different types of action that have been brought by Mr. Gauweiler. 
The ‘Unity Thesis’—Content, Foundation and Alleged Consequences 
According to many other legal scholars, the European Union constitutes a single legal system, of 
which the Communities, the CFSP and the CPJC are mere subsystems.
23 Among the multitude of 
supporting arguments the usual elements are the ‘new stage’ clause of Article 1(2) TEU, the objectives 
of the Union (Art. 2 TEU), the single institutional framework (Art. 3 TEU), the European Council as 
an organ of the Union (Art. 4 TEU), the consistent references to ‘the Union’ and ‘its Members’ in the 
TEU, the provisions on enhanced cooperation (Art. 43 et seq. TEU) and last but not least on the 
                                                      
19  On the possibility of an interpretation ‘consistent with the Constitutional Treaty’ see M. Krajewski, Die institutionelle 
Gleichgewicht in den auswärtigen Beziehungen, in:  C. Herrmann/H. Krenzler/R. Streinz  (eds.),  Die 
Außenwirtschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union nach dem Verfassungsvertrag, 2006, pp. 63 – 84 (82 et seq.); D. Thym, 
Weiche Konstitutionalisierung—Optionen der Umsetzung einzelner Reformschritte des Verfassungsvertrags ohne 
Vertragsänderung, Integration 28 (2005) 4, pp. 307 – 315 (311). 
20  Cf. M. Pechstein/C. Koenig, Die Europäische Union, 3rd Ed., Tübingen, 2000, pp. 36 et seq. And 47 et seq. Cf. also E. 
Denza, Lines in the Sand: Between Common Foreign Policy and Single Foreign Policy, in: T. Tridimas/P. Nebbia (eds.), 
European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century—Rethinking the New Legal Order, Vol. 1, pp. 259 – 272 (272): ‘To 
introduce into the Treaties uncertainties over primacy in the conduct of foreign affairs and over whether the Member 
States retain any power of independent action in foreign affairs would call into question the separate nation status of the 
Member States.’ 
21  2 BvR 839/05. Full text (in German) available at http://www.petergauweiler.de/pdf/themen/EU-Verf-Klage-27-5.pdf. 
22  See BVerfGE 113, 279 (319 et seq.). 
23  See e.g. D. Curtin/I. Dekker, The EU as a ‘Layered’ International Organization: Institutional Unity in Disguise, in: P. 
Craig/G.de Bùrca (Eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 1999, pp. 83 – 136; S. Kadelbach, Einheit der Rechtsordnung als 
Verfassungsprinzip der Europäischen Union?, in: A. von Bogdandy/C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.), Konsolidierung und 
Kohärenz des Primärrechts nach Amsterdam, Europarecht Beiheft 2/1998, pp. 51 – 66; W. Schroeder, 
Verfassungsrechtliche Beziehungen zwischen Europäischer Union und Europäischen Gemeinschaften, in: A. von 
Bogdandy (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, 2003, pp. 373 – 414; J. Wichard, Wer ist Herr im europäischen Haus, 
Europarecht (EuR) 1999, pp. 170 – 184; B. de Witte, The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek 
Temple or French Gothic Cathedral?, in: T. Heukels/N. Blokker/M. Brus (eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam—
A Legal Analysis, 1998, pp. 51 – 67;  Much Ado about Pluto? The ‘Unity of the Legal Order of the European Union’ Revisited 
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amendment of the Treaties and accession to the Union as a whole (Art. 48, 49 TEU), to name only the 
most prominent ones. Increasingly, the thesis goes hand in hand with the claim of an international 
legal personality of the European Union, based in particular but not exclusively on Article 24 TEU. 
However, the different authors adhering to this view do not always concur with regard to the 
conclusions that might be drawn from the perceived unity. In general, this position seems to have 
become the ‘middle ground’ within the discussion.
24  
Some German authors go even further. Von Bogdandy and Nettesheim in particular argue that the 
various European institutions may be considered institutions of the ‘European Union’, constituting a 
single organization with legal personality, and having absorbed the former three Communities (EC, 
ECSC, EAEC).
25 In the words of von Bogdandy,  
[t]he terms “Communities” and “pillars of the European Union” do not demarcate different 
organizations, but only different capacities with partially specific legal instruments and 
procedures. All the Treaties and the secondary law form a single legal order.
26 
The centrally claimed legal consequence is that the legal principles that the ECJ developed under 
the TEC could more or less also be applied to the TEU and secondary instruments adopted thereunder. 
Primarily, this concerns the supremacy of European Union law,
27 but it may also apply to the 
principles of loyalty, non-discrimination and the direct effect of Community law as well as to the 
applicability of general principles of law within the second and third pillar. Furthermore, the ‘unity 
thesis’ is considered to be the only legal construction capable of explaining the ‘landmark decision’ of 
the ECJ in the Airport Transit Visa case,
28 in which the Court, on the basis of Article 47 TEU, held 
itself competent to annul a measure under the TEU insofar as this encroached upon the competences 
vested in the EC,
29 a decision described as a misjudgement (Fehlurteil) by Pechstein, the main 
proponent of a strict separation between EC and EU law.
30 
                                                      
24  Cf. B. de Witte, The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic Cathedral?, 
in: T. Heukels/N. Blokker/M. Brus (eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam—A Legal Analysis, The Hague et. al. 
1998, pp. 51 – 67 (58), who, however, at the time of writing considered the position denying a legal personality of the EU 
to be the ‘middle ground’. 
25  A. von Bogdandy, The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single Organization with a Single Legal System, 
CML Rev. 36 (1999), pp. 887 – 910; A. von Bogdandy, Die Europäische Union als einheitlicher Verband, in: A. von 
Bogdandy/C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.), Konsolidierung und Kohärenz des Primärrechts nach Amsterdam, Europarecht 
Beiheft 2/1998, pp. 165 – 183; A. von Bogdandy/M. Nettesheim, Die Verschmelzung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 
in der Europäischen Union, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1995, pp. 2324 – 2328; A. von Bogdandy/M. Nettesheim, 
Die Europäische Union, Ein einheitlicher Verband mit eigener Rechtsordnung, Europarecht (EuR) 1 (1996), pp. 3 – 26; 
A. von Bogdandy/M. Nettesheim, Ex pluribus Unum fusion of the European Communities into the European Union, ELJ 
2 (1996) 3, pp. 267-289. 
26  A. von Bogdandy, The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single Organization with a Single Legal System, 
CML Rev. 36 (1999), pp. 887 – 910 (887). 
27  A. von Bogdandy, The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single Organization with a Single Legal System, 
CML Rev. 36 (1999), pp. 887 – 910 (889), 
28  C-170/96, Commission./.Council, ECR 1998, I-2763. 
29  A. von Bogdandy, The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single Organization with a Single Legal System, 
CML Rev. 36 (1999), pp. 887 – 910 (888 et seq.). 
30  Cf. M. Pechstein, Juristenzeitung (1998) 20, pp. 1008 – 1009 (1008). Christoph W. Herrmann 
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The Increasing Cross-pillarization of EU Policies 
Recent times show a clear trend towards the integration of those policies falling under the TEC and 
those falling under the TEU.
31 This development is driven by an increasing number of civil operations 
under the framework of the CFSP, which might also be considered as a matter of technical cooperation 
under Article 181a TEC; the ever-broader notion of international security, which especially brings 
development policies into the realm of ‘high’ foreign policy;
32 the closely related fight against 
terrorism including sanctions directed against private individuals instead of third countries; the 
growing awareness of the security dimension of energy policy; and, finally, the artificial division of 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice between the TEC and the third pillar brought about by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. 
The process of ‘cross-pillarization’, which resembles an increased interconnectivity between 
different EC external policies,
33 makes the choice of a correct legal basis, consistently treated as a 
‘constitutional question’ by the ECJ,
34 increasingly troublesome. Furthermore, ensuring a ‘coherence’ 
(cf. Article 3 (2) TEU) of action taken by the EC and the EU requires an increasing number of 
interdependent measures under both treaties or even measures resting upon complementary legal bases 
in both treaties. This causes problems with regard to the common reading of Article 47 TEU, which 
stipulates that nothing in the TEU ‘may affect’ the TEC.
35 
Legal Unity and Legal Diversity—Recent Approaches of the European Courts 
After some twelve years, during which the legal problems caused by the ‘cross-pillarization’ of Union 
policies played almost no role before the ECJ, they have arrived there within the last years en masse. 
Many of the issues brought before the Court concern the choice of legal basis. However, together with 
this, the effect of Union legal instruments has also been raised, as has the question of fundamental 
rights protection in the domain of the second and third pillar. 
1. Delimitation of Competences—Airport Transit Visa, Criminal Sanctions and Passenger 
Name Records 
It was in the Airport Transit Visa case
36 that the ECJ first came across the problem of the delimitation 
of the EC Treaty and the EU Treaty. The case concerned a Joint Action regarding airport transit visas, 
which the Council had adopted on the basis of the third pillar, in concreto K.3 (now Article 31) TEU. 
The measure aimed at the harmonisation of the Member States’ policies regarding the requirement of 
an airport transit visa. The Commission brought an action for annulment pursuant to then Article 173 
(now Article 230) TEC, claiming that the Joint Action was in breach of then Article 100c TEC 
(rescinded), which would have been the correct legal basis for the measure. The United Kingdom 
submitted that the action was inadmissible, because the act had been adopted under the third pillar and 
the Court had no jurisdiction over third pillar measures under then Article L TEU. Fenelly AG in his 
                                                      
31  Cf. M. Cremona, External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed Agreements, International 
Responsibility, and Effects of International Law, EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2006/22, pp. 9 et seq.; R. Wessel, The 
Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External Relations, CMLRev. 37 (2000), pp. 1135 – 1171 (1145 et seq.). 
32  Cf. the A Secure Europe in a better World—European Defence Strategy, 13.12.2003. 
33  On that see C. Herrmann, Gripping Global Governance—The External Relations of the EU between the Treaty of Nice 
and the Convention on the Future of Europe, in: T. Tridimas/P. Nebbia (eds.), European Union Law for the Twenty-First 
Century—Rethinking the New Legal Order, Vol. 1, pp. 291 – 302. 
34  ECJ, Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, [2001] ECR I-9713, paras. 5 et seq. 
35  On coherence cf. Communication from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006 - Europe in the World — 
Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, COM (2006) 278, pp. 6 et seq. 
36  ECJ, C-170/96 Commission./.Council, [1998] ECR-I 2763. Much Ado about Pluto? The ‘Unity of the Legal Order of the European Union’ Revisited 
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conclusions had pointed to a number of prior cases in which the Court had opted for a ‘functional 
approach’ in the sense that the pure formal branding of an act designed to have legal effects would not 
be decisive for its classification.
37 The ECJ, applying a much shorter reasoning and referring to then 
Article M (now Article 47) TEU, held that it was: ‘the task of the Court to ensure that acts which, 
according to the Council, fall within the scope of Article K.3(2) of the [TEU] do not encroach upon 
the powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community.’
38 
The same matter came before the Court again in 2003, in a case concerning Criminal Sanctions for 
the protection of the environment.
39 Following an initiative of the Danish Government, the Council 
had adopted a Framework Decision on the basis of Articles 29, 31(1) (e) and 34(2)(b) TEU, requiring 
the Member States in its core provision ‘to ensure that serious environmental crime is punishable 
under criminal law’. At the same time, the Council rejected a similar proposal for a Directive on the 
basis of Article 175 TEC, which the Commission had presented one year after the Danish 
Government. The Commission then brought an action under Article 35 TEU, asking for an annulment 
of the Framework Decision as it was in breach of a Community competence.
40 
Whereas in Airport Transit Visa, the Commission had lost on the merits, since the measure in 
question could not have been adopted on the basis of the TEC, this time the ECJ found that the EC 
indeed had a competence to impose an obligation on the Member States to provide for criminal 
sanctions for specific crimes against the environment. As predicted earlier,
41 the ECJ, quoting its 
ruling in the Airport Visa Case, followed a ‘reasoning’
42 of ‘what could that should’ and declared the 
Framework Decision void under Article 35 TEU for encroaching upon the powers of the EC,
43 despite 
the fact that the competence under Article 175 TEC only was concurrent and not exclusive. 
However, problems do not only occur when the Council decides to act under the second or third 
pillar instead of the Community pillar. On the contrary, a similar conflict can arise where action is 
taken on the basis of the TEC, where the EC has no competence to do so. An example of this is the 
Passenger Name Record case decided 30 May 2006.
44 Within the framework of the fight against 
terrorism, the United States passed some legislation providing that airlines operating flights to, from, 
or across the United States territory had to provide the US customs authorities with electronic access 
to the data contained in their reservation and departure control systems, the so-called ‘Passenger Name 
Records’. Since the provision of these data is problematic under European data protection regulations, 
an agreement was finally concluded between the EC and the United States on the basis of Articles 25 
and 26 of Directive 95/46/EC.
45 The Directive itself was based on Article 95 TEC.
46 It explicitly 
excluded the processing of data: 
in the course of an activity falling outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided for 
by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case to processing operations 
                                                      
37  Conclusions of AG Fenelly, C-170/96, [1998] ECR-I 2763, para.7 et seq. 
38  ECJ, C-170/96 Commission./.Council, [1998] ECR-I 2763, para. 16. 
39  ECJ, C-176/03, Commission./.Council, [2005] ECR-I 7879. 
40  See H. Weiß, EC Competence for Environmental Criminal Law—An Analysis of the Judgment of the ECJ of 13.9.2005 
in Case C-176/93, Commission v. Council, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien 2006 (3), pp.381 – 421 (385 et seq.). 
41  See e.g. P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, 2004, p. 150.  
42  Neither the AG nor the ECJ made any effort to argue the question what „affects“ in Article 47 TEU actually means in any 
detail. 
43  ECJ, C-176/03, Commission v. Council, [2005] ECR-I-7879, paras. 38 – 55. 
44  ECJ, Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, Parliament v. Council, [2006] ECR-I 4721. 
45  Decision 2004/496/EC, OJ 2004 L 183/83. 
46  For an account of the factual and legal background of the case see conclusions of AG Lèger in Joined Cases C-317/04 
and C-318/04, [2006] ECR-I 4721 at paras. 1 – 42. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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concerning public security, defence, State security […] and the activities of the State in areas of 
criminal law.
47 
Since the purposes for which the US customs authorities required the passing on of the data were 
clearly related to State security, the ECJ annulled the decision to conclude the agreement, holding that 
it did not fall under the scope of the Directive. The EU subsequently concluded a new agreement on 
the basis of Articles 38 and 24 TEU.
48 However, given the clear wording of the Directive, the 
importance of the judgment for the determination of the relationship between the TEU and the TEC 
should not be overestimated. One could easily think of a similar exclusion of data processing with 
regard to policies inside the TEC, e.g. environmental policies. 
2. Interconnecting Treaty Objectives—Yusuf and Kadi 
Of much greater importance is the judgment delivered by the Court of First Instance in the case of 
Yusuf and Kadi.
49 The cases concerned the freezing of assets within the framework of the fight against 
terrorism. In order to implement UN Security Council regulations on the matter, the EU and EC had 
adopted a number of legal instruments, among them EC Regulations based upon Articles 60, 301 and 
308 TEC. One of the issues before the CFI was, whether Article 308 TEC could have served as the 
sole legal basis for sanctions directed against private individuals who were not related to the rulers of 
any third country. For the use of Article 308 TEC, however, the measure in question must be adopted 
with a view to attaining one of the aims of the Community. In this respect, the Commission had 
claimed, that one of the general objectives of the Community was to ensure international peace and 
security. The CFI rejected this line of reasoning, emphasising the coexistence of Community and 
Union law: 
Contrary to what the Commission maintains, indeed, nowhere in the preamble to the EC Treaty is 
it stated that that act pursues a wider object of safeguarding international peace and security. 
Although it is unarguably a principal aim of that treaty to put an end to the conflicts of the past 
between the peoples of Europe by creating ‘an ever closer union’ among them, that is without any 
reference whatsoever to the implementation of a common foreign and security policy. The latter 
falls exclusively within the objects of the Treaty on European Union which, as emphasised in the 
preamble thereto, seeks to ‘mark a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken 
with the establishment of the European Communities. 
While, admittedly, it may be asserted that that objective of the Union must inspire action by the 
Community in the sphere of its own competence, such as the common commercial policy, it is not 
however a sufficient basis for the adoption of measures under Article 308 EC, above all in spheres 
in which Community competence is marginal and exhaustively defined in the Treaty. 
Last, it appears impossible to interpret Article 308 EC as giving the institutions general authority 
to use that provision as a basis with a view to attaining one of the objectives of the Treaty on 
European Union. In particular, the Court considers that the coexistence of Union and Community 
as integrated but separate legal orders, and the constitutional architecture of the pillars, as intended 
by the framers of the Treaties now in force, authorise neither the institutions nor the Member 
States to rely on the ‘flexibility clause’ of Article 308 EC in order to mitigate the fact that the 
Community lacks the competence necessary for achievement of one of the Union’s objectives. To 
decide otherwise would amount, in the end, to making that provision applicable to all measures 
falling within the CFSP and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJC), so that the 
Community could always take action to attain the objectives of those policies. Such an outcome 
                                                      
47  Article 3 (2), first indent. 
48  See Council Decision 2006/729/CFSP/JHA of 16 October 2006 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an 
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger 
name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, OJ 2006 L 298/27. 
49  CFI, T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, [2006] ECR-II 3533; T-
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would deprive many provisions of the Treaty on European Union of their ambit and would be 
inconsistent with the introduction of instruments specific to the CFSP (common strategies, joint 
actions, common positions) and to the PJC (common positions, decisions, framework decisions).
50 
Despite finding that the TEU and the TEC constituted two ‘integrated but separated legal orders’, 
the CFI continued, interpreting the special provisions of Articles 60 and 301 TEC, which bridge the 
divide between the TEU and the TEC: 
In the circumstances, account has to be taken of the bridge explicitly established at the time of the 
Maastricht revision between Community actions imposing economic sanctions under Articles 60 
EC and 301 EC and the objectives of the Treaty on European Union in the sphere of external 
relations. 
It must be held that Articles 60 EC and 301 EC are quite special provisions of the EC Treaty, in 
that they expressly contemplate situations in which action by the Community may be proved to be 
necessary in order to achieve, not one of the objects of the Community as fixed by the EC Treaty 
but rather one of the objectives specifically assigned to the Union by Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union, viz., the implementation of a common foreign and security policy. 
Under Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, action by the Community is therefore in actual fact action by 
the Union, the implementation of which finds its footing on the Community pillar after the Council 
has adopted a common position or a joint action under the CFSP.
51  
On the basis of this reasoning, and referring also to the single institutional framework and the 
obligation of consistency laid upon the institutions by Article 3 TEU, the CFI held the use of Articles 
60, 301 and 308 TEC as a combined legal basis for the contested Regulation to be legitimate. The 
reference to Article 3 TEU is particularly interesting, since Article 46 TEU does not grant the Court of 
Justice jurisdiction over this provision, and therefore jurisdiction is also denied to the CFI. The ECJ had 
hence refused to interpret then Article B (now Article 2 TEU) as being clearly outside its jurisdiction.
52 
3. EC Law Principles Applied to EU Law—Maria Pupino 
In another recent case, the ECJ was confronted with the question whether the principle of consistent 
interpretation also applied to Framework Decisions enacted under the third pillar. An Italian court had 
referred a question under Article 35 (3) (b) TEU concerning the interpretation of Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings. France and Italy had questioned the 
admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling, arguing that the answer could have no relevance 
for the case to be decided by the Italian court. The main arguments put forward were that Framework 
Decisions had no direct effect, and that because of the difference between Directives and Framework 
Decisions, a principle of consistent interpretation could not exist with regard to Framework Decisions, 
or if it existed, it could not oblige a national court to construe national legislation contra legem. The 
UK and Sweden also emphasised the intergovernmental nature of the cooperation between Member 
States in the context of Title VI of the TEU.
53 
                                                      
50  CFI, T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, [2006] ECR-II 3533, paras. 
154 – 156. 
51  T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, [2006] ECR-II 3533, paras. 159 – 
161. Cf. also CFI, Judment of 12 December 2006, T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran, paras. 105 
et seq., where the CFI held that the powers of the EC under Art.  301 and 60 TEC did not constitute ‘powers 
circumscribed by the will of the Union’, i.e. that the EC has discretion whether or not to take the measures foreseen in the 
CFSP instrument. 
52  ECJ, C-167/94, Grau Gomis, [1995] ECR-I 1023, para. 6. 
53  ECJ, C-105/03, Maria Pupino, [2005] ECR-I 5285, para. 26. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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The ECJ, following the conclusions of AG Kokott in principle, decided to the contrary. In the view 
of the Court, the wording of Article 34 (2) (b) TEU is closely inspired by Article 249 (3) TEC. The 
Court went on: 
Irrespective of the degree of integration envisaged by the Treaty of Amsterdam in the process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Article 1 EU, it is perfectly comprehensible that the authors of the Treaty on 
European Union should have considered it useful to make provision, in the context of Title VI of 
that treaty, for recourse to legal instruments with effects similar to those provided for by the EC 
Treaty, in order to contribute effectively to the pursuit of the Union’s objectives.
54  
The ECJ then emphasised the importance of its jurisdiction under Article 35 TEU, which would be 
deprived of most of its useful effects if individuals were not entitled to invoke Framework Decisions 
in order to obtain a consistent interpretation of national law. Furthermore, the Court rejected the 
argument that the duty of loyalty did not exist with regard to the TEU because of the lack of a 
provision similar to Article 10 TEC, and that hence the principle of consistent interpretation could not 
be ‘extended’ to the third pillar. Moreover, the Court found that: ‘[i]t would be difficult for the Union 
to carry out its task effectively if the principle of loyal cooperation, […], were not also binding in the 
area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters […].’
55 
However, even adopting the conclusion drawn by AG Kokott that the principle of loyalty also 
applied with regard to Union law, the Court abstained from a more detailed analysis of its fundamental 
character. This contrasts with the conclusions of the AG, who had explicitly distinguished the TEU 
from the EEA Treaty, by stating: 
Unlike the EEA Agreement, which is concerned only with the application of rules on free trade 
and competition in economic and commercial relations between the Contracting Parties, but 
provides for no transfer of sovereign rights to the inter-governmental institutions which it sets up, 
the Treaty on European Union, as stated in the second paragraph of Article 1, marks a new stage in 
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. To that end it 
supplements the activities of the Community with new policies and forms of cooperation. The 
term policies indicates that, contrary to the view of the Swedish Government, the Treaty on 
European Union includes not only inter-governmental cooperation, but also joint exercise of 
sovereignty by the Union. Moreover, the first paragraph of Article 3 EU obliges the Union to 
respect and build upon the acquis communautaire. 
The increasing degree of integration expressed in the phrase ‘ever closer cooperation’ is also 
shown by the development of the Treaty on European Union which, after its creation by the Treaty 
of Maastricht, was brought ever more closely into line with the structures of Community law by 
the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice and is to be merged fully with Community law by the 
Constitutional Treaty.
56 
The explicit disregarding of the legal nature of the TEU demonstrated by the ECJ (‘irrespective of 
the degree of integration’) is, on the one hand, regrettable. On the other, the view taken by the ECJ is 
fully in line with its general approach towards the interpretation of international agreements and the 
exploration of their character, e.g. with a view to a possible direct effect, including the interpretation 
of the TEEC in Van Gend en Loos.
57 
As we have seen, the European Courts are increasingly frequently confronted with questions 
related to the character of the second and third pillar of the TEU as well as with questions regarding 
their relationship with the first pillar, Community Law. However, the cases decided so far do not 
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reveal any clear theoretical underpinning with regard to the nature of and relations between the 
different pillars of European Law. 
The ‘Unity Thesis’ Revisited—Does it make any difference? 
1. Theoretical Foundations 
Having emphasised the importance of definitions at the outset of this paper, we must now clarify the 
meaning of ‘legal order’ and its ‘unity’. The term ‘legal order’ (Rechtsordnung) usually refers to a 
given set of norms that belong together, e.g. because they are applicable in a given territory as law of 
the land or to certain subjects of law. The term implies that there are ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, i.e. some legal 
norms that belong to the legal order and some others that do not. At the same time, the notion ‘order’ 
refers to a certain degree of structure, arrangement or system. The idea of ‘unity’ appears with regard 
to both the question of belonging as well as the question of the internal structure of the legal order. 
However, the meaning in either case is not quite the same. 
The notion ‘unity of the legal order’ has been used in manifold senses in legal theory.
58 Two 
different meanings deserve attention but must also be distinguished in the present context.
59 Firstly, 
the concept of unity is closely related to Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (Reine Rechtslehre).
60 
According to this theory, every legal order is based on a basic norm (Grundnorm), which constitutes 
the highest norm in a hierarchically structured pyramid of norms (Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung).
61 All 
norms that form part of the legal order formally derive their validity from the basic norm, since they 
were generated in accordance with the rules adopted on the basis of the Grundnorm. In this formalistic 
sense, the basic norm serves to identify the belonging of a multiplicity of norms to a unitary legal 
order. Secondly, the ‘unity of the legal order’ constitutes a claim of substantive, normative unity, i.e. 
the absence of lacunae and contradictions within an identified legal system. This claim is considered 
as contributing to the peacemaking and integrating function of the legal order, traditionally associated 
with the State and the constitution if one confines this notion to documents that not only limit existing 
power, but also constitute and regulate all the exercising of sovereign power.
62 In this sense, the idea 
of unity is based on the assumption of a theoretical single will of the sovereign, this even being the 
people or the nation, which is free of contradictions, or to put it differently: which is coherent or 
consistent.
63 Given this, it is worthwhile considering using uniformity (Einheitlichkeit) instead of unity 
                                                      
58    M.  Baldus, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung. Bedeutung einer juristischen Formel in Rechtstheorie, Zivil- und 
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59   For a similar differentiation cf. S.  Kadelbach, Einheit der Rechtsordnung als Verfassungsprinzip der Europäischen 
Union?, in: A. von Bogdandy/C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.), Konsolidierung und Kohärenz des Primärrechts nach Amsterdam, 
Europarecht Beiheft 2/1998, pp. 51 – 66 (52 et seq.). 
60  H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd Ed., Vienna 1960. 
61  H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd Ed., Vienna 1960, pp. 228 et seq. 
62  Cf. N. Krisch, Die Vielheit der europäischen Verfassung, in: Y. Becker et al. (eds.), Die Europäische Verfassung—
Verfassungen in Europa, 45. Assistententagung Öffentliches Recht, pp. 61 – 89. 
63  The difference between the wording of Articles 1(3) and 3(1) and (2) TEU in the English language and in other languages 
has been pointed out elsewhere (see C. Tietje, The Concept of Coherence in the Treaty on European Union and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, 1997 (2) EFA Rev., pp. 211 – 233 (211 et seq.). On the concept of coherence in 
the framework of European law see in greater detail S. Bartea, Looking for Coherence within the European Community, 
11 (2005) ELJ 2, pp. 154 – 172 (154 – 160); P. Gauttier, Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the 
European Union, 10 (2004) ELJ 1, pp. 23 – 41 (24 et seq.); cf. also S. Besson, From European Integration to European 
Integrity: Should European Law Speak with Just One Voice, 10 (2004) ELJ 3, pp. 257 – 281, who uses Dworkin’s 
concept of integrity instead of coherence. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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(Einheit) when claiming the internal coherence of a legal order. As a postulate, unity is a powerful tool 
in the construction of legal rules within a legal system, e.g. in order to avoid or solve conflicts. 
However, it is a theoretical construction and cannot answer every interpretative question; nor must it 
be used to overcome differing regulatory ideals embodied in different legal subsystems of the same 
legal order. Whether and to what extent a legal order envisages unity or preserves diversity is a 
question of interpretation in its own right. One may criticise legal systems for their low degree of 
uniformity and may argue that this puts their legitimacy at risk. However, there is no legal rule that 
requires a pouvoir constituant to create uniformity and avert diversity.
64 Furthermore, to claim the 
substantive unity of a legal order, one must first prove the connectedness of the respective norms first. 
There is no point in arguing that two norms that belong to different legal systems must be interpreted 
in conformity on the ground of unity. On the other hand, the diversity of legal rules is not a decisive 
sign that two norms do not belong to the same legal order. 
The two different meanings of ‘unity’ laid out above, despite their differences, are closely related. 
As already pointed out, ‘unity’ in the sense of the peaceful resolution of conflicts is served by a legal 
order providing complete and coherent answers. The available legal rules will most probably be more 
coherent where they can be traced back to a single source of legitimacy. Lastly, this will be the easiest 
case, where a theoretical Grundnorm is mirrored by a Constitutional or Supreme Court as the ultimate 
arbiter of legal conflicts. 
It is not always crystal clear in what sense the notion ‘unity’ is used by different authors with 
regard to the European Union legal order. Sometimes the different layers of analysis appear to be 
admixed. This picture becomes even more complicated when sociological or political science 
arguments are added to the analysis. The behaviour of the different actors may very well serve as an 
indication of their specific understanding of the legal framework. However, the normative quality of 
such behaviour is highly questionable outside the accepted categories of ‘subsequent practice’ or 
‘customary law’,
65 the relevance of both of which concepts is rather unsettled in European law. The 
overwhelming practice of the ‘single institutional framework’ seems to make a clear-cut case for 
speaking of the European Union as a single organization or a single actor from a social science 
perspective. However, in a Rechtsgemeinschaft (Community built on the rule of law), which the EC at 
least constitutes,
66 we should be extremely careful about arguing on the basis of mere practice that 
does not have any normative foundation. I will hence deliberately confine myself in the following to 
developing a legal—some would say legalistic—argument. Only by doing this, I believe, can we 
derive methodologically correct answers to legal  questions, i.e. to questions of interpretation and 
application of the law to a given or hypothetical case. In the following, then, I will turn to the most 
important questions connected with the theme of the ‘unity of the legal order’, in order to test its 
validity, necessity and utility. 
2. The Common Source of the European Union Legal Order 
The aim of the present paper is not to contribute to the complex theoretical debate about the 
Grundnorm or the ultimate point of recognition of European Law, its replacement or shifting, or who 
would ultimately decide in case of a constitutional crisis.
67 Many of these questions remain indeed 
                                                      
64  Cf. S. Kadelbach, Einheit der Rechtsordnung als Verfassungsprinzip der Europäischen Union?, in: A. von Bogdandy/C.-
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unsolved. However, to answer the question whether the European Union is a single legal order or 
simply a franchiser who organises the ‘corporate identity’ of EC Law and the second and third pillar 
legal systems, it is necessary to find the ultimate legal source inside the legal system of the European 
Union. The question of unity from this perspective would thus be, whether all European Union law, 
enacted under any of the pillars, derives its validity from the same legal norm. In order to answer this, 
we must treat all acts of the institutions, be these Regulations, Directives, Joint Actions, Common 
Positions or anything else, like threads poking out of a confused ball of wool. If we unroll the ball and 
follow all ends, will we find that all the threads are tied together into a knot in the middle? 
Under the Treaties, it is clear that all secondary and tertiary instruments derive their legitimacy 
from being enacted on the basis of and according to the procedures laid down by the respective Treaty, 
but what about the TEC and Titles V and VI of the TEU? Do they stem from the same source? At first 
glance, it seems obvious that the existence of two different Treaties means that they do not share their 
source of legitimacy, but rest on separate acts of the constituent power of the Member States. 
However, such a description would have to leave out the fact that the different Treaties are firmly tied 
together, especially by Articles 48 and 49 TEU: Neither amendment nor accession can take place with 
in respect of only the TEC or the TEU.
68 Of course, during the IGC it may be decided to amend only 
provisions of Title V or VI of the TEU, but this would include a deliberate decision not to change the 
TEC or vice versa. The ultimate rule of recognition within the legal system of the European Union is, 
consequently, the collective will of the Member States, as ‘Masters of the Treaty’.
69 How they 
establish the legality of their respective ratifications is, however, not a matter of European Union law, 
despite the requirements vis-à-vis the internal constitutional order that can be derived from Articles 6, 
7 and 49 TEU. However, this does not mean that the European Union derives its legitimacy directly 
from the peoples of the Union, as sometimes purported in academic writings.
70 The peoples of Europe 
are only a formal source of legitimacy, as they have a say in the respective ratifications of their 
countries. So, we can trace back the whole body of European Community and Union law to a single 
source, the collective will of the Member States, which means that in a formalistic sense Community 
and Union law belong to the same legal order, even though the linkage is one on the highest possible 
level of the legal order: the ultimate source of the legal order as such. 
3. The Question of Legal Personality 
An analysis of the unity of the European Union’s legal order cannot completely avoid the question of 
the EU’s legal personality. However, I do not intend to add any substantive argument to a discussion 
which I consider—in this case rightly on the basis of international practice—a fait accompli.
71 Even a 
naïve reading of the post-Amsterdam TEU, speaking of ‘the Union’, ‘its identity’ and ‘its Members’ 
makes one wonder how one could ever have questioned the existence of an entity independent of its 
Members. That such an entity, insofar as it is capable of acting independently also in relation to third 
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countries, or could at least be perceived as doing so, would be attributed international legal personality 
from the perspective of public international law, seems equally obvious and follows a fundamental 
necessity of law, which requires the attribution of rights and duties to those who actually appear to 
act.
72 On the other hand, the wording of the Treaties is so clear in its distinction between the EC and 
the EU, that the artificial claim of a single legal person EU into which the EC and the EAEC have 
been merged, should be renounced. The current treaty-making practice of the EC and the EU confirm 
the distinction between the two. 
Furthermore, the question of the legal personality of the EU is relatively unimportant for the 
assessment of the unity of the legal order. Whether or not a political entity as a whole enjoys legal 
personality within its own legal system or whether it always acts through organs which are equipped 
with legal personality is an issue of the construction of that legal order, but does not answer the 
question whether the legal order presents itself as a formal and substantive unity.
73 
4. Conflicts of Norms in the European Union Legal Order 
One of the central features of a legal order is its capacity to solve the conflicts that arise from 
contradictions between different rules of the system. The commonly applied interpretative principles 
such as interpretation in conformity with higher-ranking norms, lex specialis derogat legi generali, 
and lex posterior derogat legi priori serve this purpose. Where conflicts cannot be solved by applying 
these principles, one of the norms must be disregarded. If a hierarchy between the rules can be 
established, this will normally be the inferior norm. The same principles can also apply to whole legal 
subsystems, e.g. different legal regimes for different policy areas with different goals, or within federal 
legal systems between the federal and the state level. Where no explicit rules provide for the resolution 
of conflicts, they must be established by interpretation. This is more likely to happen where a single 
superior court has the ultimate jurisdiction to rule on these matters.
74  
Applying this very basic methodology to the relationship between the TEU and the TEC, we can 
easily see that no general hierarchy between the pillars or the Treaties can be established.
75 Neither of 
the Treaties derives its validity from the other, since both rest upon the collective will of the Member 
States. However, there are several ‘bridges’ between the two Treaties, which establish specific 
validity-relationships between the two components, e.g. Article 301 TEC, but the existence of these 
bridges does not mean that they constitute two separate legal orders, nor that they form two parts of 
                                                      
72  Cf. R. Wessel, The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External Relations, CMLRev. 37 (2000), pp. 
1135 – 1171 (1138 et seq.). A similar development has taken place in German Company Law, where the 
Bundesgerichtshof held the Gesellschaft bürgerliche Rechts (GbR) to be rechtsfähig (having legal capacity) after more 
than hundred years during which legal doctrine thought of the GbR as being just a framework for the joint rights of its 
partners, which meant e.g. that you had to sue all the partners etc. This form of association is widespread among the free 
professions in Germany; see BGH NJW 2001, p. 1056. 
73  For a more detailed discussion of this issue see A. von Bogdandy, The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a 
Single Organization with a Single Legal System, CML Rev. 36 (1999), pp. 887 – 910 (891 et seq.); A. von Bogdandy/M. 
Nettesheim, Die Europäische Union, Ein einheitlicher Verband mit eigener Rechtsordnung, Europarecht (EuR) 1 (1996), 
pp. 3 – 26 (15 et seq.); M. Schroeder, Verfassungsrechtliche Beziehungen zwischen Europäischer Union und 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften, in: A. von Bogdandy (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Berlin 2003, pp. 373 – 414 
(382 et seq.); cf. also B. de Witte, The pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple or French 
Gothic Cathedral?, in: T. Heukels/N. Blokker/M. Brus (eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam—A Legal Analysis, 
The Hague et. al. 1998, pp. 51 – 67 (61 et seq.) who also points to the difference between equipping an International 
Organization with legal personality vis-à-vis third countries and its Member States. 
74    Cf. also S. Kadelbach, Einheit der Rechtsordnung als Verfassungsprinzip der Europäischen Union, in: A. von 
Bogdandy/C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.), Konsolidierung und Kohärenz des Primärrechts nach Amsterdam, Europarecht 
Beiheft 2/1998, pp. 51 – 66 (54), R. Wessel, The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External 
Relations, CMLRev. 37 (2000), pp. 1135 – 1171 (1137 et seq.). 
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just one order. Similarly, the existence of provisions governing the effect of rules of Public 
international law within the German legal order is interpreted as supporting monist as well as dualist 
thinking. To which reading one adheres depends upon whether one considers the respective rules as 
being constitutive (supporting a dualist view) or declaratory (supporting a monist view).
76 Many of the 
possible conflicts between the TEC and the second and third pillar are sufficiently solved by the 
explicit provisions. 
The absence of a general hierarchy in the sense of a validity relationship between the two main 
Treaties
77 does not necessarily mean that they do not belong to the same legal order. As pointed out 
above, they are firmly linked together by the final provisions of the TEU. The claim of unity is, 
however, not appropriate to solve horizontal conflicts. Indeed, for the application of the two most 
important principles, lex specialis and lex posterior, it is not even necessary to consider the two 
systems as a ‘unity’. This is because even if it is assumed that both Treaties constitute two completely 
separate legal orders, they still would have a mutual interpretative influence if one applied the 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law as laid down in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, in particular in Article 31 (2) (a) and (3) (c) thereof. According to these 
provisions, any norm of public international law applicable between the parties has to be taken into 
account for the interpretation of a Treaty. Under the lex posterior derogat legi priori principle, which 
is also to be found in Article 30 (2) of the Vienna Convention, the TEU could even have partially 
derogated the TEC without any formal connection being established between the two Treaties, simply 
because the parties to the Treaties are identical. To prevent this lex posterior effect was one of the key 
functions of Article 47 TEU, to which we will now turn. 
5. Demarcation of Competences between the pillars: Art. 47 TEU 
One of the most important conflicts between the pillars is the possible overlap between the different 
legal bases that can be used for the pursuance of the objectives of the EU and the EC. The necessary 
demarcation between the two is governed by Article 47 TEU. As pointed out above, this provision is 
not the only one that is relevant for the determination of the relationship between the TEC and the 
second and third pillar of the TEU, nor is the delimitation of competences its only area of application. 
However, it is one of the key provisions and its reading has a significant impact on the construction of 
the European Union’s legal order.  
In Environmental Criminal Sanctions, the ECJ found, that the Council was in breach of Article 47 
TEU when it enacted a Framework Decision under the third pillar, since the EC had a competence to 
act under Article 175 TEC. At first glance, this seems odd, given that the EC competence under the 
environmental policy is not an exclusive one, i.e. the Member States could still act on their own in the 
field of the environment. However, the Court had already taken the same position in Airport Transit 
Visa and it was predictable that—assuming a Criminal Sanctions Competence of the EC—it would 
arrive at the conclusion that the Framework Decision was in breach of Article 47 TEU. Arguably, the 
remaining concurrent competence of the Member States included the joint intergovernmental exercise 
under the third pillar and did not ‘affect’ the TEC.
78 If, on the other hand, action under the second or 
third pillars is considered as an action by the European Union as an organization in its own right, 
acting through one of its organs, there is no such thing as an intergovernmental exercise of Member 
State competence. The competences under the TEU would then be (non-exclusive) competences of the 
European Union. Alternatively could the Member States have subsequently transferred part of the 
                                                      
76  Cf. M. Schweitzer, Staatsrecht III, 8th Ed., Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 15 et seq. 
77  Article 47 TEU to which we will turn below does not—in my submission –establish a supremacy of the TEC over the 
TEU (nor the other way around), but only a safeguard mechanism that operates very much similar to a lex specialis rule 
of interpretation. 
78  P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, 2004, p. 150. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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competence they had retained when entering into the TEC, to the European Union, creating a parallel 
competence of the EC and EU? 
Two arguments seem possible to support the approach of the ECJ. Firstly, one could argue that the 
power the Member States retained was categorically non-transferable. However, to make this 
argument, one would need to distinguish between transferable and non-transferable competences and 
it is difficult to see the basis for such distinction. However, on the basis of Article 47 TEU, it ca be put 
forward that the Member States, when entering into the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, 
waived by virtue of Article 47 TEU their right to transfer competences to the European Union which 
they had—even non-exclusively—already transferred to the EC, because the creation of ‘parallel 
competences’ of the EC and the EU, would indeed ‘affect’ the TEC. The reason for this is that the 
institutional setup of the second and third pillar deviates significantly from the setup under the TEC. 
This institutional balance would thus indeed be affected; especially the right of initiative of the 
Commission and the rights of the European Parliament under Article 251 TEC, if the second and third 
pillar had established competences parallel to those already existing, since they would have created a 
way to circumvent the rules governing the exercise of the competence under the TEC. This reading of 
Article 47 TEU is supported by Article 1(3) TEU, which states: ‘The Union shall be founded on the 
European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this 
Treaty.’ (emphasis added). 
The word ‘supplement’ refers to something that is added to something else in order to complete the 
latter. This suggests a subordination of the second and third pillar, because, wherever the TEC already 
provided for legal rules, it was not incomplete and so did not needed to be supplemented.
79 This 
interpretation is also in line with Article 11 (1) TEU despite the broadly-worded catch-all description 
of the CFSP to be find therein, since the broad scope is still very useful as to whether or not a specific 
issue falls into the scope of the CFSP when it comes to vertical conflicts with the Member States. 
Furthermore, the CFSP can be read as a fall-back competence for all cases not yet covered by the TEC. 
For such a lex generalis, it makes perfect sense to be formulated as broadly as possible.
80 Lastly, this 
reading of Article 47 TEU is supported by Article 30 (2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
The bottom line of the argument is as simple as this: whatever could already be done under the 
TEC did not need to, and therefore could not be assigned to, the European Union, the integrationist 
character of which is much weaker. The effect of Article 47 TEU is thus to render the competences in 
the second and third pillar subordinate to the competences in the TEC, i.e. to make their use dependent 
on the non-existence of competences under the first pillar. This type of subordination is, however, not 
unheard of inside the TEC itself. Article 308 TEC can only be used as a legal basis if there is no other 
legal basis in the TEC to be found and if some additional conditions are met.
81 
The perception of the competences under the second and third pillar as subordinate to those under 
the TEC does not make the demarcation unnecessary. However, the criteria for this exercise, in 
particular with regard to the demarcation of the CFSP and the first pillar external relations, are not 
clear. The pending case on Small Arms and Light Weapons
82 may shed light on this question. Given 
the broadly worded goals of the CFSP as laid down in Article 11 (1) TEU, as well as the mix of goals 
found in the reality of external relations, the ‘aims and content’ test used by the ECJ to delineate the 
different legal bases under the TEC
83 is not well-suited in that regard. More convincingly, the choice 
                                                      
79  Cf. the argument made by R. Wessel, The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External Relations, 
CMLRev. 37 (2000), pp. 1135 – 1171 (1146 et seq.). 
80  Cf. R. Wessel, The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External Relations, CMLRev. 37 (2000), pp. 
1135 – 1171 (1148 et seq.), who considers the TEC external competences to constitute lege speciali to the lege generali CFSP. 
81  On the details of Article 308 TEC cf. M. Bungenberg, Artikel 235 EGV nach Maastricht, 1999. 
82  C-91/05, OJ 2005 C 115/10. 
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of legal basis should be based on the different kinds of instruments that are available to the EU and the 
EC for the conduct of their external relations, once it has been established that the measure has a 
foreign policy goal in a broad sense. It is obvious that there are wide differences between the catalogue 
of acts of the organs found in Article 249 TEC and in Article 12 TEU. Furthermore, the descriptions of 
Joint Actions and Common Positions under the second pillar are very specifically directed at typical 
foreign policy measures. According to Article 14 TEU: ‘Joint actions shall address specific situations 
where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required.’ [emphasis added] 
Similarly, Article 16 TEU stipulates: ‘Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to 
a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature.’ [emphasis added] 
Both provisions reflect the ad hoc nature of foreign policy, which is determined by operational 
activities and non-legislative diplomatic activity. The possibility of international agreements—a 
further classic instrument of foreign policy—within the sphere of the CFSP does not contradict this 
submission. Moreover, the fact that international agreements are not mentioned as genuine measures 
by which the CFSP is to be pursued (cf. Article 12 TEU) confirms the view that the CFSP is mainly 
designed as a policy which does not require truly legal instruments, i.e. instruments designed to be 
applied by a court of law. On the other hand, the increasing use of Article 14 TEU for the 
establishment of agencies equipped with separate legal personality
84 may be seen as evidence that an 
institutionalisation of foreign policy might be necessary. Nevertheless, at present this practice is 
arguably illegal under the current TEU. However, to find that there might be situations in which 
neither the EC nor the EU can take the necessary foreign policy measures does not militate against the 
submitted approach toward demarcation of competences. Moreover, it would be peculiar if no gaps 
occurred in a system that is built on the principle of limited attribution of powers. 
However, the real problems of demarcation between the pillars are to be found elsewhere. It is the 
relationship between the competences of the EC under Article 308 TEC and the competences of the 
EU under the second and third pillar which is particularly troublesome. Article 308 TEC has been 
given a rather lax interpretation by the Court of Justice, rendering the requirement that action should 
prove necessary ‘in the course of the operation of the common market’ virtually meaningless. At least 
some of the current overlap between the TEU and the TEC would disappear if a more restrictive 
stance was taken on Article 308 TEC.
85 This holds e.g. true for the problems created by the RRM,
86 
which was enacted on the basis of Article 308 TEC but has hardly any relation to the operation of the 
common market, a view that is supported by the fact that the Constitutional Treaty provides for an 
explicit competence for a similar instrument in Article III-320. 
6. Unity and Coherence 
The separation of powers between the EC and the EU and the different institutional setup of both areas 
make contradictory behaviour possible if not likely, in particular with regard to external relations. 
Hence, coherence is written into Article 1 (3) and Article 3 and Article 13 (3) TEU as a goal to strive 
for. The obvious problem from the perspective of the ‘unity of the legal order’ theme is that the 
obligation to ensure coherence between EU and EC policies is laid down in the TEU only, with no 
provision of the TEC incorporating the duty. On the other hand, Article 47 TEU is interpreted as a 
prohibition to read implied Treaty amendments into the TEU or TEC. This view is mainly based on the 
wording of Article 47 TEU which replicates the heading of Title II of the TEU and is therefore 
interpreted as meaning that except for Article 8 TEU and the Final Provisions, nothing in the TEU 
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245/17. 
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shall affect the TEC, including Articles 1 to 7 TEU.
87 If this is the correct reading of Article 47 TEU, 
the Commission in particular would be under no obligation of ensuring coherence when acting on the 
basis of its TEC powers. However, this would render the obligation almost meaningless, as has already 
correctly been pointed out.
88 However, to arrive at this conclusion that changes to the TEC may have 
been made implicitly by the TEU as well, one does not have to have recourse to the unity argument, 
but the submission can solely be based on the existing Treaty provisions.
89 
7. EU Law as Part of the ‘New Legal Order’? 
So far we have established that the European Union legal order can be described as a single legal order 
from a formal point of view, though being made up of three different legal subsystems. These 
subsystems are tightly connected by Articles 48 and 49 TEU and are based on the collective will of the 
Member States. At the same it has been shown that a general hierarchy cannot be established between 
the subsystems, and that the claim of unity is not capable of resolving the conflicts between the 
different legal subsystems, embedded in the different treaties, nor even within these subsystems themselves. 
So is it really irrelevant to speak of the European Union legal order as a single legal order? In my 
submission, the key question is not primarily a question of unity, but one as to the legal character of 
Union law: Does Union law share the features of the ‘new legal order’ established by the Court of 
Justice in Van Gend en Loos? As pointed out above, the application of central principles of 
Community law to Union law—direct effect, primacy and loyal cooperation amongst them—is the 
purported key legal consequence of the unity thesis. Having been swirling around ever since the 
creation of the European Union,
90 the question as to the nature of Union law has been increasingly 
raised in more recent writings, even though not necessarily as a question regarding the unity of EU and 
EC law.
91 Given the deliberate placing of the second and third pillar outside the Community 
framework by the Member States, it would be difficult to argue in favour of an identical legal nature 
of the pillars only on the basis of a claimed unity. Moreover, some of the authors that contend most 
strongly the intergovernmental nature of the second and third pillar and who even deny the legal 
personality of the EU, go much further than others with regard to the substantive connectivity of the 
two Treaties by accepting that the TEU may have changed the TEC implicitly despite the wording of 
Article 47 TEU.
92 The discussion has gained additional momentum with the Constitutional Treaty, 
which integrates all pillars, makes reference to the ‘Community basis’ (Article I-1 (1)) for the exercise 
of competences and declares all Union law to have primacy over the law of the Member States 
(Article I-6). Which exact consequences are to be derived thereof for the provisions on the CFSP is 
heatedly debated in academic writings.
93 However, the Constitutional Treaty is increasingly a mirage 
on the horizon, which makes it even more important to take a look at the developments that are really 
                                                      
87  Cf. H.-J. Cremer, Artikel 47 EU-Vertrag, in: C. Calliess/M. Ruffert (eds.), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag, 
2nd Ed., Neuwied 2002; H. Herrnfeld, Artikel 47 EUV, para. 7, in: J. Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar, Heidelberg 2000. 
88  Cf. R. Wessel, The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External Relations, CMLRev. 37 (2000), pp. 
1135 – 1171 (1148), who points to other provisions of the TEU implicitly modifying the TEC. 
89  M. Pechstein/C. Koenig, Die Europäische Union, 3rd Ed., Tübingen 2000, pp. 58 et seq. 
90  Cf. U. Everling, Reflections on the Structure of the European Union, CMLRev. 29 (1992), pp. 1053 – 1077 (1064), who 
considers the TEU to belong to the category of integration treaties, whose construction would in the first place be 
oriented to the objectives of integration. 
91  See D. Curtin/I. Dekker, The Constitutional Structure of the European Union: Some Reflections on Vertical Unity-in-
Diversity, in: P. Beaumont/C. Lyons/N. Walker (eds.), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, 59 – 78 
(67 et seq.); C. Timmermans, The Constitutionalization of the European Union, YEL 21 (2001/2002), pp. 1 – 12 (8 et 
seq.). 
92  M. Pechstein/C. Koenig, Die Europäische Union, 3rd Ed., Tübingen 2000, pp. 5 et seq. and 58 et seq. 
93  Cf. M. Cremona, A Constitutional Basis for External Action? An Assessment of the Provisions on EU External Action in 
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taking place, in particular the more recent case-law of the Court of Justice. The Maria Pupino case has 
given a first indication of the position of the ECJ, even though the Court did not make it clear whether 
it considers Union law to be a ‘new legal order’ in the sense of the Van Gend en Loos case. However, 
some of the arguments that it put forward supporting the duty of consistent interpretation closely 
resemble those used more than 40 years ago, among them the effectiveness of the carrying out of the 
Union’s objectives and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. The mentioning of the ‘similar effect’ 
of the legal instruments available under the TEU and the extension of the principle of loyalty to the 
third pillar—instead of a foundation on provisions in the TEU itself—support the assumption that the 
ECJ in principle recognises the integrationist character of the TEU. Also, the very claim of a duty of 
national courts deriving from the Treaty implies that the TEU (not the framework decisions 
themselves) does not only impose obligations on the Member States as subjects of public international 
law, but also on their organs—the executive and the judiciary—directly. The duty of consistent 
interpretation as a duty of Union law thus partly deprives the Member States of their choice as to how 
to conform to their obligations flowing from the TEU. That is, it bears the presumption of a direct 
applicability of the TEU in the legal order of the Member States,
94 although this does not mean that the 
secondary instruments adopted under the TEU share these features, or, in the case of Framework 
Decisions, direct effect is explicitly ruled out by Article 34 (2) (b) TEU. Moreover, in the case of the 
CFSP, it seems hard to imagine how an instrument of foreign policy could have a direct effect on 
individuals, especially if the legal restrictions on the possible character of the instruments as laid out 
above were obeyed.
95 Nevertheless, if the Court had the opportunity to rule on how to resolve a 
conflict between a Union legal instrument and the law of the Member States (most possibly with 
regard to a Union agreement under the third pillar), it is hard to see the Court ruling in favour of the 
law of the Member States instead of declaring the primacy of Union law.
96 Ultimately, this would 
mean, then, that Member States’ laws would have to be disapplied insofar as they are in conflict with 
Union law. 
The Unity of the Legal Order and the Constitutional Treaty 
At first glance, the Constitutional Treaty
97 seems to solve all the legal questions surrounding the ‘unity 
question’. It brings together Community and Union law under one single treaty and establishes a new 
legal person called ‘European Union’. The continuing existence of the autonomous legal personality of 
the EAEC is certainly of minor relevance. As pointed out above, the Constitutional Treaty also 
extends in principle of primacy of Community law to the areas of the current second and third pillar. 
Nevertheless, besides the persistent questions with regard to the actual meaning of primacy in the 
realm of the CFSP, unity-related problems persist, as demonstrated by Article III-308 Constitutional 
Treaty, which stipulates: 
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of 
the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Constitution for 
the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles I-13 to I-15 and I-17. 
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application 
of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Constitution for 
the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter. 
                                                      
94  Cf. C. Herrmann, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 2005, pp. 436 – 438 (438). 
95  C. Timmermans, The Constitutionalization of the European Union, YEL 21 (2001/2002), pp. 1 – 12 (9). 
96  For the arguments supporting that view see D. Curtin/I. Dekker, The Constitutional Structure of the European Union: 
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Article III-308 of the Constitutional Treaty is mostly regarded as replacing Article 47 TEU. It is 
then pointed out that, contrary to Article 47 TEU, Article III-308 CT has a Janus face, since it protects 
not only the traditional EC external policies from the CFSP, but also vice versa.
98 This analysis of 
Article III-308 CT is, of course, correct, given the clear wording of its paragraph 2. However, attention 
must also be drawn to the significant difference in the identification of what shall not affect or be 
affected. It is in this regard that Article III-308 CT deviates significantly from Article 47 TEU, which 
stipulates that ‘nothing in this Treaty shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
[…]’. Due to this wording, Article 47 TEU is widely read as a collision norm, derogating the 
application of the lex posterior derogate legi priori rule in relation between the TEU and the TEC. 
Within the Constitutional Treaty, which would enter into force in all parts at the same time, it loses 
this function completely. Consequentially, Article III-308 Constitutional Treaty could not be read as 
meaning that the provisions on the CFSP cannot have changed the provisions on the former EC 
external policies. 
Furthermore, despite the unification of the pillars into one Treaty, the demarcation of competences 
becomes even more troublesome with regard to the possible overlaps between the CFSP and other 
external policies, since the provisions on the CFSP no longer contain separate objectives and the CFSP 
applies to ‘all areas of foreign policy’. This not only suggests that the presumption in favour of ‘EC 
Competences’ under the Constitutional Treaty should be upheld,
99 but also that it is not the objectives 
that should be used but the legal character of the measures in question, to demarcate the CFSP from 
other external policies once it has been established that they fall into the sphere of external action. 
Concluding Observations 
Given the intensity of the debate about the unity of the European Union legal order, one would expect 
that the question had a greater effect on the interpretation of EU law. However, on the contrary, there 
is hardly any question of interpretation that can be solved having recourse to the concept. The possible 
conflicts between the Treaties are mostly horizontal in nature and are dealt with explicitly by the 
Treaties. The application of the lex posterior rule is not applicable with regard to TEU and TEC by 
virtue of Article 47 TEU and in applying the lex specialis principle, the concept of unity is neither of 
great help nor is it necessary for actually deciding which rule is more specific. Applying customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law would create similar results in many cases. 
Furthermore, the cases so far decided by the ECJ are in many respects comparable with those decided 
under the TEC in situations that have a relationship with different EC policies. Given this, it is hardly 
surprising that the ‘merger of the pillars’ under the Constitutional Treaty has little impact on the 
questions discussed above.
100 What we arrive at is the conclusion that it makes little sense to claim the 
‘unity of the legal order’ with regard to the relationship between the TEC and the TEU. From a 
formalistic point of view, there is indeed a strong case to perceive the TEU and TEC as subsystems of 
one single legal order. However, confronted with a great diversity of institutional designs—between 
the pillars as well as in-between them—there is hardly any room for a substantive claim of unity. As 
stated above, the formal unity of a legal order only allows for the presumption of a single will of the 
rule enactor, coherent and free of contradictions. However, this presumption may be rebutted by the 
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very wording of the rules actually enacted. Such is the case for the European Union legal order: it is a 
single, unitary, but very incoherent legal order of a constitutional character or, as the CFI put it in the 
Yusuf case, ‘integrated but separate’
101 legal orders. It is a mere play on words to deny it 
characterizations such as constitution, legal order, legal system or similar, for the sole reason that it 
does not mirror our state-experience-shaped expectations in all aspects. This being said, one should abstain 
from drawing too heavily on such notions as ‘unity of the legal order’ when making a legal argument. 
The true questions to answer hence seem to be different, among them the vanishing issue of the 
‘legal personality’ of the EU and, for the future, the question whether the second and third pillar share 
the character of the TEC as a ‘new legal order of public international law’ as well as the role and rights 
of private individuals under the second and third pillar.
102 And yet again: to answer these, we do not 
need to put forward a concept of such unclear bearing as the ‘unity of the legal order’. The answers 
instead lie in the provisions of the TEU itself.  
However, for the time being, holding EU Law to constitute a ‘new legal order’ would require a 
significant amount of political will, as well as juridical capability. The Convention on the Future of 
Europe and the IGC 2004 had this political will and the Constitutional Treaty leaves unresolved 
almost only the questions of primacy and judicial oversight with regard to the CFSP. However, France 
and the Netherlands failed to deliver the ratifications needed for it to enter into force. Even the use of 
all passerelles in the current Treaties could not bring about the same result with regard to the nature of 
the legal order of the European Union. Further efforts would be needed, particularly by the Court of 
Justice. However, the Court’s leeway is small, given the close scrutiny by the Member States’ 
constitutional courts, as the German Bundesverfassungsgericht recently demonstrated manifestly once again. 
So what does it matter at the end of the day whether we call Pluto a planet or a ‘dwarf planet’? To 
me as an astronomical layman, it does not seem to have too many consequences, especially not for the 
question of whether it exists or not. The same seems to be true for the question whether or not to 
describe the legal order established by the TEU and the TEC as a unity or not. As I have tried to show, 
it is more of a façon de parler than anything else, at least beyond the sphere of pure legal theory, i.e. in 
the real world of European law, where interpretations are born, live, work and die. 
The Architecture—Greek Temple, Gothic Cathedral or…? 
According to customary rules of European legal scholarship, a treatise of the structure of the European 
Union must conclude with some metaphor, ideally drawn from architecture. So what do we see now, 
when we stand in front of this peculiar building called ‘European Union’? Is it still a temple structure, 
resting on three pillars? Or does it instead resemble a French gothic cathedral with the similarity with 
the EU being one with regard to its floor plan?
103 A lot depends, of course, on the perspective which 
distorts our image of an object as we come up close to it. This simple truth was rediscovered by 
Filippo Brunelleschi, one of the most brilliant architects of the Renaissance, if not of all times, in 
1410. Maybe we should instead describe Brunelleschi’s  masterpiece, the cupola of the Florentine 
dome Santa Maria del Fiore, as the best-suited metaphor for the EU. The cupola was built without any 
pillars or scaffolding supporting the growing structure, which consists of a thick inner and a much 
thinner outer layer. At the beginning of the work, which took 14 years for the cupola alone, it was not 
certain, if it could be built, nor were the necessary instruments already invented. Indeed, how exactly 
                                                      
101 CFI, T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, [2006] ECR-II 3533, para. 
156. 
102 Cf. Conclusions of AG Mengozzi of 26 October 2006, C-354 and 355/04 P, Segi and others v Council. 
103 For this metaphor see B. de Witte, The pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple or French 
Gothic Cathedral?, in: T. Heukels/N. Blokker/M. Brus (Eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam—A Legal Analysis 
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the beautiful construction was achieved remains an unresolved mystery of architecture. Spanning a 
diameter of 47 metres, the cupola is the greatest brick-structure roof ever built in the world.
104  
As regards the European integration process, we still seem to be in the critical phase of 
construction, with a high degree of uncertainty as to whether or not the roof will hold up and with 
quite some judicial masonry works still ahead of us. Given that the foundations of the European 
Union’s philosophical underpinnings were laid with the re-interpretation of the human condition 
during the Renaissance, the cupola does not seem to be the worst of architectural metaphors for the 
ongoing endeavour of European integration and the European Union. Last but not least: the dome and 
the cupola still exist after more than 500 years and they attract admirers from all over the world, just as 
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